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While the close British decision to get out of the European Union was made in 
a referendum a while ago on 23 June, there is still the feeling in the UK: What 
have we done? Where do we go? How do we get there? 
Questions that should have been asked at the referendum, rather than after it. But 
there you are. When raw emotion and shallow argument reign, profound decisions 
are made without proper reflection or preparation. 
Since then the question has also been raised whether or not such a thing could occur 
in ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It won’t but then again it may.
First of all, let’s be clear. It is not likely there will ever be such a surplus of democracy 
in ASEAN, whether among individual member states or as a group, that there could 
be an ‘In or Out’ referendum like the one which resulted in Brexit.
Such democracy as there is in ASEAN is a pale reflection of the European model. 
Perhaps five ASEAN states, at a pinch, could be called democracies. They are, at most, 
mixed democracies, with varying control-freak tendencies. In one of them there is 
new leadership with Trump-like populism, perhaps a precursor of what a President 
Donald Trump would be like in America - a loose cannon.
Maybe in that member state, the Philippines, there could be a ‘Phixit’ referendum in a 
state of pique although, as shown in the careful Filipino handling of the 12 July Law 
of the Sea Arbitration Tribunal award on the South China Sea dispute against an irate 
China, there can be underlying realism after hyperbolic madness. (Mr. Duterte had 
once proposed to ride a jet ski into the Chinese navy.)
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Then again President Duterte’s threat in August to leave the United Nations, like 
tempestuous Indonesian President Sukarno did in the 1960s, after heavy criticism of 
extrajudicial killings in his no-holds-barred drug war points to some uncertainty over 
what the Philippines under Duterte might do. And next year the Philippines takes the 
chair of ASEAN in its 50th year. Given his nocturnal tendencies, perhaps he might tell 
other ASEAN leaders in the dead of night they had better buck up as the regional  
body was more inclined towards form rather than substance, something Duterte is 
impatient with.
But he would have to deal, apart from the flawed democracies, with one ASEAN state 
which is an absolute monarchy, two communist states, and one other worse than a 
flawed democracy - a dictatorial one (if that is not a contradiction in terms). Making 
an imperfect ten is a state, through a referendum no less, which is set to become a 
democracy managed by the military, as the referendum indeed was.
The political systems in ASEAN are so fragmented and diverse. There is not a democratic 
tradition anywhere that any major decision would be brought to the people. There will 
not be in ASEAN a ‘In or Out’ referendum of the UK kind - free, open and all too easy. 
Certainly with none of the regimes in ASEAN is there likely be such a reckless gamble as 
to leave an existential decision with the people. 
Not that there is everywhere in ASEAN always a high degree of leadership responsibility. 
It is just that the people are not invited to make too many decisions once governments 
are in power. So, from very different starting points, ASEAN will not be so people-
centric - a refrain of the ASEAN community declaration last November - as to give its 
citizens such a choice.
The UK - specifically David Cameron - screwed up. There was a rather careless 
Oxford Union debate approach by him in the referendum campaign. This was quite 
irresponsible when Brexit is a highly complicated matter. Even Brexiteers - like Boris 
Johnson - looked numb in the morning after the night before, like theirs was a  
Pyrrhic victory.
Some experts are now saying divorcing the EU may take 10 years. The UK will have to 
negotiate at least six major deals to re-establish its place in the world after Brexit. For 
instance, among the six deals, Britain has to regain full membership of the WTO, not 
necessarily a straightforward thing, where the EU is the representative body.
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UK-ASEAN Relations After Brexit
UK - ASEAN economic relations are likely to become more active. They may very  
well grow.
One of the ironies of the Brexit decision is that the UK, insofar as much of ASEAN is 
concerned, was never an exclusive EU entity. So its getting out of Europe does not 
present to ASEAN major issues of dissociation that it does between the EU and  
the UK.
The UK has long had strong solo relationships with a number of ASEAN states. While 
Commonwealth countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei immediately come 
to mind, former Prime Minister David Cameron was quite committed to developing 
UK-ASEAN economic links with other states. His official trip to a number of ASEAN 
countries last year included an important stop in Jakarta, both to underline the 
importance of Indonesia and of the regional body’s secretariat which is located there.
Indeed the UK-ASEAN Business Council operates outside the EU-ASEAN Business 
Council, although without disavowing it. In other words, at the organised private 
sector level, the UK has been pursuing its own agenda as well. These business 
councils are important trade and investment lobbying bodies in ASEAN. The involved 
business executives prepare position papers on matters such as trade facilitation, 
investment and tax policies. They get to have dialogues and meetings with ASEAN 
leaders, ministers and officials to push their case.
It is not too fanciful to expect the UK to be more proactive, now that it is leaving the 
EU, in the pursuit of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN, well ahead of the 
stalled EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations. As perhaps it might be more proactive on a FTA 
with the United States even as Germany and France have poured cold water on TTIP 
(the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), although no major economy 
has committed itself to strengthening links with a post-EU Britain — indeed the 
wish was expressed in the G20 joint communique in Hangzhou that the UK would 
continue with its close association with the EU.
The ASEAN economy as a whole  is already the seventh largest in the world, with 
some extrapolations making it the fourth largest in 2030. It has the third largest 
population in the world after China and India, with 60 per cent under the age of 
35. A couple of years ago it overtook China in FDI. It is an economic region whose 
growth prospects are attracting the UK.
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However, with respect to the attraction in the future of the UK market to 
ASEAN as a trade and investment destination, much depends on how the British 
economy performs outside and is linked to the EU. Outward ASEAN investment 
and distribution centres particularly will be based on close-to-market and cost-of-
operations considerations. Market size and access will matter as well as operating 
costs.
So, while ASEAN is quite used to the UK as a standalone semi-detached member 
country, the resilience and performance of its economy outside the EU will be 
watched closely. The future of the UK economy is not a matter only of concern to 
the British. ASEAN political and business leaders - as those of the rest of the world 
- are bothered as well.
While the ASEAN association is no way as close and intricate as the EU’s and, 
in the instance of the WTO, ASEAN countries are individual members of the 
trade organisation,  the important point is the need to think through any 
decision to break away from any association or organisation. It is not a simple 
in or out matter to be decided on the basis of emotion alone. There are a lot of 
knotty issues, especially relating to the economy, trade and FTAs. There can be 
unintended consequences.
With respect to ASEAN, it will not be lost on member states there is no need to 
make any grand gesture of walking out, or threatening to do so, especially as 
commitment to ASEAN’s so-called rules-based regime is not so onerous anyway. 
So why rock the boat when there is promise of great potential benefit and any 
present problems can be treated in a ‘let sleeping dogs lie’ fashion?
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South China Sea
We have noted also the wide divergence in the political models in the EU and ASEAN. 
Indeed ASEAN may think its democratic deficit is a blessing in disguise.
Such parsimony however should not be represented as wisdom among ASEAN 
leaders. Cynicism and realism are two different things that might yet come out of 
the ASEAN bag. If leadership and wisdom are required, for instance, to hold the 
association together against present and future challenges, ASEAN leaders could 
equally blunder.
The most critical test of ASEAN unity today is over what position to take on Beijing’s 
South China Sea claims and assertive behaviour. Again and again ASEAN - including 
its four South China Sea claimant states - fails to take a collective stand as China, 
through land reclamation and militarisation, as well as naval support of its fishing 
fleets, achieves de facto control over almost all of the disputed atolls and waters. 
The Law of the Sea Tribunal ruling on 12 July that there is no basis in international 
law for most of China’s assertions and actions has only accentuated the division rather 
than help form a common front. The cracks have become clearer.
Yet China is able to entice ASEAN Member States with possibilities, over which it 
would be up to ASEAN to keep united or not. On 17 August the China Daily reported 
there is agreement to negotiate the code of conduct in the South China Sea by 
mid-2017. There is also a deal in the making on a code of unplanned encounters at 
sea (CUES). All this to go to the ASEAN-China summit on 6-8 September. All very 
good news indeed, substantiated at the ASEAN-China summit in Vientiane in early 
September.
On the other hand, Singapore, the ASEAN coordinator of relations with China until 
2018 when the island republic takes the chair of ASEAN, has been receiving some 
stick on Chinese social media. The Global Times castigates it as the “little red dot”. 
As with all ASEAN countries, but more so with Singapore, the tricky test is how to 
navigate the Sino-US rivalry in Southeast Asia. China can blow hot and cold, and keep 
ASEAN states responding every which way.
At the heart of this lack of unity is not just that not all ASEAN members are claimant 
states in the South China Sea, but rather more so their economic dependence on 
China. All ASEAN states have significant interest in the economic relationship with 
the rising giant that has grown tremendously in the last couple of decades which, to 
a greater or lesser extent, they do not wish to disturb. Indeed which they wish, with 
many Chinese blandishments, to see grow.
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A couple of ASEAN member states depend on China for their economic life. They 
will never cross Beijing. There is a ‘soft middle’ which are careful not to antagonise 
China even if they feel they are being dragged to the limit. Only one among them 
appears to have drawn a line in the sand and is clear on the equal sovereign rights 
of all states big or small. And then there is a sharp and hard outer edge comprising 
two ASEAN members although the hardest, now with new leadership, is softening 
its stand.
ASEAN, in other words, is totally disunited over the South China Sea and China’s 
absolute claim to it. It needs to show unity to negotiate effectively with China but 
different economic and national interests are pulling it apart.
On a more general plane, while the EU has been wedded to principles - like the 
free movement of people - ASEAN has always been flexible and diverse about these 
things. With immigration and the deluge of refugees being identified as the prime 
reason leading to Brexit, ASEAN may feel it has bragging rights with its flexible and 
realistic approach to integration and human rights issues.
But there is no cause for celebration in ASEAN. Certainly, in respect of not taking a 
principled stand on China’s assertive sovereign - and suzerain - claims in the South 
China Sea, the future could come to haunt ASEAN in some unintended ways.
Even if the calculation is that China’s regional dominance is inevitable, the nature of 
ASEAN state relationship with Beijing is still something that can be fashioned short 
of total subservience. Full capitulation now will guarantee a future as vassal states.
There is value in principles. There are options that can be exercised.
In the very first year of the so-called ASEAN community the path to greater 
integration, including in the economic field, could get even slower as divergence on 
the South China Sea issue sours political relationships among member states. 
There are also dangers of total dependence on economic expansion without 
sufficient attention being given to the social issues of growth.
Social services, better distribution of income and wealth are critical if ASEAN 
countries are not to be confronted by the ferment and discord of economic denial 
- which could then so easily be attributed to ASEAN integration rather than to bad 
and unjust national governance.
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More than immigration, which was the symptom, the underlying cause of the Brexit 
vote was the anger of the social underclass denied economic justice who attributed 
their condition to foreigners. Jingoism is something politically easy to whip up 
when there is such anger. It is something ASEAN should anticipate.
So beneath the tranquillity of the ASEAN way, the smiles and linking of arms, are 
many issues that cannot always be kept there. They should be addressed. They 
could cause discord, disunity and tumult. If not exactly the break-up of ASEAN, 
they could make ASEAN meaningless and lead to the regional organisation not 
being taken seriously. 
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